Wallace, B. Alan. The Taboo of subjectivity

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consciousness, the knower, the subject, or bearer of knowledge, is one term of pure
experience; objects of knowledge are the other term. James says that the instant field
of the present is at all times what I call the pure experience. It is only virtually or
potentially either object or subject as yet. For the time being, it is plain, unqualified
actuality, or existence, a simple that. 41
While in the state of pure experience there is no self-splitting of this reality into
consciousness and what the consciousness is of. Its subjectivity and objectivity are
functional attributes solely, and they are retrospectively identified only when one re-
engages with one s conceptual framework, in which subjects and objects are separated.
For James, the separation of experience into consciousness and content comes by
way of addition, not subtraction. That is, a given undivided portion of experience, taken
in one context of associates, plays the part of knower, of a state of mind, of
consciousness ; while in a different context the same undivided bit of experience plays
the part of a thing known, of an objective content. Thus, in one group it figures as a
mental process, in another group as a mental object. And, since it can figure in both
groups simultaneously, one may speak of it as being both subjective and objective.42
According to this theory, just as a perceptual object such as fire does not exist as
an idea within an individual but is experienced outside, so is imagined fire not located
inside of a thinking subject but occupies a definite place in the outer world. The
difference, he says, between perceived and imaginary fire is that the latter cannot burn
perceived sticks, though it may burn imaginary sticks. Perceived fire, which is commonly
deemed real in comparison to imaginary fire, does have causal efficacy in the physical
world; and it is on this basis that real experiences are distinguished from mental ones
and things are distinguished from our thoughts of them. However, what we call the
physical world consists of a confluence of these so-called real and imaginary elements.
Our perceptual experiences, being the originally strong experiences, form the nucleus of
this world.
A past event that is recalled in the present bears the same relation to the individual
as something that is presently perceived; that is, the one is not a known object and the
other a mental state. Both influence the individual in similar ways with a reality that is
directly felt in experience, and both constitute one s experiential world. Even the contents
of dreams and hallucinations, he points out, are still experienced out there and not
inside of ourselves.43 Just as perceived objects are present within a field of
consciousness, so are recollected objects and imaginary objects states of mind; and they
all demonstrate causal efficacy with respect to the mind.
While James regards both consciousness and matter as relations, and he insists
that relations in general can be perceived, there is an asymmetry in his insistence that
matter, but not consciousness, can be observed. The asymmetry goes further. James
acknowledges that objective physical objects have their own history, composition, and
effects apart from our consciousness of them; but he does not grant these qualities to
mental states or to consciousness itself. Unlike physical phenomena, consciousness, he
says, is composed of nothing. But this position seems peculiar if, as he proposes,
consciousness is no less real than the physical phenomena that appear to it.
The asymmetry in James s view of mind and matter may be due in part to his
advocacy of a field theory of consciousness, in contrast to an atomistic theory, which
he vigorously rejects. I would argue, however, that the nature of consciousness does not
intrinsically conform either to a field theory or an atomistic theory. Rather, different
kinds of conscious events become apparent when inspected from the perspective of each
of these different conceptual frameworks. Using James s field theory, one may ascertain
an individual, discrete continuum of awareness; and using the atomic theory one may
discern within that stream of consciousness discrete moments of awareness and
individual, constituent mental factors of those moments. Thus, while certain features of
consciousness may be perceived only within the conceptual framework of a field theory,
others may be observed only in terms of an atomistic theory. This complementarity is
reminiscent of the relation between particle and field theories of mass/ energy in modern
physics. The crucial point here is that neither conceptual framework is inherent in the
nature of pure experience. James seems to have fallen into the trap of reifying his own
concept of a field of consciousness, and this may have prevented him from determining,
even to his own satisfaction, the way in which consciousness does and does not exist.44
James did not present a practical means of transcending one s familiar conceptual
framework and entering into the state of pure experience. On the contrary, he declared,
Only new-born babes, or men in semi-coma from sleep, drugs, illnesses, or blows, may
be assumed to have an experience pure in the literal sense of a that which is not yet any
definite what. 45 Given his keen interest in and appreciation for mystical experience, it is
strange that he apparently did not consider that advanced contemplatives may have
gained access to conceptually unmediated consciousness that would have a strong
bearing on his notion of pure experience.
Padmasambhava on Conceptually Unstructured Awareness [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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